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Abstract
In this paper we provide original ﬁndings on the impact of local ﬁ-
nancial development (LFD) on manufacturing ﬁrms' energy intensity in
European and Central Asian (ECA) post communist countries. We im-
plement the two-step method of Guiso et al. (2004) in order to build a
lagged measure of ﬁnancial development at the local level. The paper is
the ﬁrst to use this methodology to assess local ﬁnancial development in
the ECA region and to test its eﬀect on ﬁrm-level energy demand. Ac-
cording to related literature, our ﬁndings also show that ﬁrm size matters.
But we also provide a new insight about the non-linear eﬀect of ﬁnancial
development depending on the scope of the ﬁnancial market. We show
that while energy consumption of small businesses is more aﬀected by
local ﬁnancial markets, large ﬁrms are more sensitive to countrywide ﬁ-
nancial in-depth. Overall, this paper provides econometric evidence for
a ﬁnancial access explanation of the "energy eﬃciency gap". Improving
ﬁnancing opportunities should increase ﬁrms' energy eﬃciency. Moreover,
focus on local conditions and small ﬁrms should be an important feature
of active energy-saving ﬁnancial policies.
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1 Introduction
The narrow and ongoing issue of medium and long-term economic sustainaiblity
put energy eﬃciency at the top of the policy agenda for the next decades. Not
only for environmental and health priorities but also for the competitiveness
of ﬁrms. The energy related problematic is especially important for the region
going from Central Europe to Central Asia. Economic agents inherited energy
inneﬁcient structures and behaviors, and as a consequence ECA countries use on
average twice more energy to produce each unit of GDP than the industrialised
countries group. As expressed in Table I, in 2007 even comparing to a sample of
emerging countries, transition economies are by far the most energy intensive.
Margins to modernise productive assets in order to improve energy performances
are substantial. In this way, the impact of ﬁnancial access on ﬁrms' energy
intensity should be of a sizeable magnitude and should be able to ﬁll, at least
partly, the energy intensity gap between transition and industrialised countries.
Table I: Energy Intensity in Selected Groups of Countries, in 2007
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum N
Industrialised 137.6 68.8 49.7 426.1 27
Emerging 178.5 65.5 68.2 297.2 19
Transition 260.4 161.5 101.8 791.3 25
Energy intensity is expressed as energy consumed in kilotonnes of oil equivalent
per constant 2000 US$, values are averaged over country groups. List of countries
is displayed in table A1. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Does local ﬁnancial development inﬂuence energy intensity? The "energy eﬃ-
ciency gap"1 literature suggests that limited external access to capital should
constrain ﬁrms' ability to undertake energy eﬃciency projects (DeCanio, 1993).
In a purely competitive context, if all economically proﬁtable investment op-
portunies can be ﬁnanced, then ﬁrms' energy consumption should be at an
economically optimal level. But if access to ﬁnancial funds is limited, and when
information is not perfect, ﬁrms must therefore make a trade-oﬀ between sev-
eral investment projects, thus constraining energy-saving investments. Lack of
capital limits funds to be devoted to energy eﬃciency measures, which are fur-
thermore considered low on the priority list by managers. Potential ﬁnancial
barriers may explain, at least partly, the "gap" between cost-eﬀective energy
eﬃcient investments and the level of such investments actually implemented.
The issue of economic sustainability as well as the rising energy cost in the
current worldwide context of ﬁnancial shortage, make this question of a crucial
and growing importance.
Since the work of Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), an extensive empirical
1The term of "energy eﬃciency paradox" can also be found in the literature, see for exemple
Martin et al. (2012).
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literature has discussed whether ﬁnancial development aﬀects various aspects
of ﬁrm-level performances. Evidence has shown that ﬁnancial access improves
ﬁrms' probability to emerge, to grow, to invest, to innovate and to export (Guiso
et al. (2004), Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2006), Guariglia (2008), Gorodnichenko
and Schnitzer (2010) among others). Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no
econometric studies has focused on ﬁrms' energy performance related to wider
ﬁnancial access.
This paper aims to ﬁll this gap by questioning whether or not local ﬁnancial
access is important for manufacturing ﬁrms' energy intensity in the ECA region.
For this purpose, we update the seminal two-step method developed by Guiso
et al. (2004) to build-up a lagged measure of ﬁnancial development at the
local level. We estimate a local ﬁnancial access indicator using data from the
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) of 2002 and
2005 to explain ﬁrm energy intensity in 2007. We provide an original ﬁnding
that energy intensity of ﬁrms located in ﬁnancially well developped regions is
signiﬁcantly lower. We check for the robustness of our results, using alternative
speciﬁcations, regional ﬁxed eﬀects and instrumental variables. Consistent with
related litterature, our ﬁndings also show that the ﬁrm size matters. While
aﬀecting all ﬁrms, the local ﬁnancial development eﬀect on energy intensity is
lower as ﬁrm size increases. In contrast, the country ﬁnancial development has
a stronger impact on energy consumption of larger ﬁrms. Overall, this paper
provides econometric evidence for a ﬁnancial access explanation of the "energy
eﬃciency gap" in the particular case of the post-communist countries.
Starting with King and Levine (1993), a large body of the literature shows that
cross-country ﬁnancial development heterogeneity matters for economic perfor-
mance. However, within-country variation of ﬁnancial access has attracted less
attention. Overall evidence of papers dealing with this issue strongly supports
the role of local ﬁnancial development. Thus, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and
Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2007) provide evidence that cross-state variation in
banking regulation fosters state-level growth within United States. Guiso et al.
(2004) and Hasan et al. (2009) ﬁnd a positive impact of local ﬁnancial develop-
ment and eﬃciency in countries inside the European Union (EU). And ﬁnally,
Kendall (2012) and Fafchamps and Schündeln (2013) show positive growth im-
pact of regional banking depth in two developing countries, India and Marocco
respectively. But, our paper is the ﬁrst to analyse the role of regional ﬁnancial
development over ECA countries.
Sub-national ﬁnancial development focus is relevant only in the case where phys-
ical distance between lenders and borrowers may segment local ﬁnancial mar-
kets. As documented by Peterson and Rajan (2002) and Bofondi and Gobbi
(2003), due to transaction costs and assymetric information, distance is likely
to aﬀect access to ﬁnance. Peterson and Rajan show that, even in the United
States, the distance between small ﬁrms and their banks matter for the provision
of banking funds. From the quoted literature and previous evidence about the
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role of local ﬁnancial markets, we expect to ﬁnd signiﬁcant variation in regional
ﬁnancial development across our sample. Indeed, distance between lenders and
borrowers can make borrowers' screening and monitoring harder and thus may
lead to adverse selection and moral hazard. And these issues should be of great
importance as the ECA region displays lower levels of development and ﬁnancial
integration comparing to the US or EU-15 member states.
Another important feature of the local ﬁnancial development should be its po-
tential non-linear eﬀect. Indeed, if local conditions matter, its consequences
should be lower for a priori less ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. Petersen and Ra-
jan (2002) and Berger et al. (2005) provide evidence that small businesses are
more dependent on local ﬁnancial markets because they are less prone to borrow
when lenders are far apart. This evidence is pointed out by Guiso et al. (2004)
and Fafchamps and Schündeln (2013). In accordance with these papers, we test
the assumption that eﬀect of local ﬁnancial development on energy intensity
is decreasing with ﬁrm size. But the coverage of our sample allows us to go
deeper in the analysis and to provide a new insight for the non-linear ﬁnancial
development eﬀect. We test whether large ﬁrms are more able to seize broader
(countrywide) ﬁnancing opportunities than do smaller businesses.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in three imprortant ways. First,
to our knowledge we are the ﬁrst to examine energy intensity in ECA coun-
tries using large manufacturing ﬁrm-level data. Second, we provide original
econometric evidence that improvements of ﬁrms' energy use may be stimu-
lated through better ﬁnancial development. Morevover, we show that eﬀet of
ﬁnancial access depends on the ﬁrm size and the scope of the ﬁnancial market.
Finally, our paper contributes to the small but growing literature on local ﬁ-
nancial conditions. It is the ﬁrst to focus on ECA countries and unlike previous
literature, we can directly examine the importance of local ﬁnancial markets
against country ﬁnancial supply.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops the econometric
model and presents the data. Section 3 explains in detail the construction of
our variable of local ﬁnancial development. Section 4 discusses extensively our
econometric results. Finally, Section 5 concludes and proposes policy recom-
mendations.
2 Econometric Framework and Data
In this section we start ﬁrst by setting a ﬁrm cost function. Then, under the
assumption of cost minimisation and applying Sheppard's lemma, we derive an
equation of energy intensity. Finally, we present the data used for our empirical
estimations. We want to look at the diﬀerences in energy intensity between
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ﬁrms facing diﬀerent local ﬁnancial access. We ﬁrst need to set the theoretical
framework of our energy demand model, before presenting strategy used to
build our indicator of local ﬁnancial development (Section 4) and analyse the
estimation results (Section 5).
For the purpose of our empirical question, following a rather standard approach,
we adopt the translog theoretical factor demand framework (Christensen et al.,
1973). We assume that a ﬁrm's technology can be described with a variable
(or quasi-ﬁxed) cost function (see Brown and Christensen, 1981) given only by
the cost of energy and intermediate materials, while capital and labour are as-
sumed to be quasi-ﬁxed factors. Assuming labour as quasi-ﬁxed seems adequate
and ﬁtting in this case.2 Our choice is motivated by market and out-of-market
rigidities observed in the former Soviet bloc countries (Rutkowski, 2007). More-
over the labour quasi-ﬁxity is in line with large labour hoarding and the very
slow unemployment decrease in these countries during the last decade, despite
sustained growth performances since the 2000'. But relaxing this assumption
does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the result of our variables of interest. We also have
considered labour as a variable input. Including the ﬁrm's average wage as a
labour price in our equation does not change our main result, whereas the labour
price elasticity provides an incoherent sign for a variable input.3 Therefore, the
restricted cost function of a ﬁrm i takes the following form:
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where a, b ∈ {E,M} index energy and materials variable production factors, wa
represents factor price for input a, Y is gross output, L and K are respectively
labour and capital ﬁxed inputs. The term B is supposed to capture an energy
bias in the ﬁrm's production technology.
The homogeneity restrictions allow normalization of the translog cost function
by one of the factor prices. For simplicity purposes, we normalized the cost
2Even less usual, considering labour as a quasi-ﬁxed input is not new (Oi, 1962). Morrison
(1988) provides an applied example with labour and capital as quasi-ﬁxed factors, but in the
case of a generalized Leontief restricted cost function. Some papers as Cole et al. (2008),
Bloom et al. (2010) and Morikawa (2012), also make an assumption of labour ﬁxity even if it
is not explicitely speciﬁed.
3Results are available upon request.
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function using materials price as the numeraire in (1):4
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Demand for energy input, applying Shephard's Lemma, is given by the cost
share of energy: sE =
δ ln( C
wM
)
δ ln( w
E
wM
)
. Diﬀerentiating (2) with respect to the relative
price of energy provides the following energy intensity equation:
sEi = αE + αEE2 ln
wEi
wMi
+ αEY lnYi + αEK lnKi + αEL lnLi + αEBBi (3)
To test wether ﬁrm-level energy intensity is related to ﬁnancial access, we will
allow the energy bias term to vary with our indicator of local ﬁnancial devel-
opment. We also use macroeconomic indicators of ﬁnancial development to
ensure the adequacy of the highlighted eﬀect and to override the problem of
identiﬁcation of our "local" variable.
We assume that relative factor price will be accounted by industry and country
ﬁxed eﬀects. Therefore, the most general stochastic form we use is as follows:
sEi = αE + αEY lnYi + αEK lnKi + αEL lnLi + αLFDLFDx + αZZi + i (4)
where LFDx is the indicator of local ﬁnancial development in region x, and we
anticipate its coeﬃcient to be negative. Z is a set of further controls including
ﬁrm control variables and industry and country dummies. We expect to ﬁnd
positive coeﬃcients of capital and labour ﬁxed inputs and negative coeﬃcient
associated with the coeﬃcient of output, as ﬁrms should face economies of scale.
The construction of our LFD variable is explained in Section 4.
Our dependent variable sEi is given by the share of energy expenditures over total
variable cost.5 We use ﬁrm-level cross-sectional data from the BEEPS jointly
conducted by the EBRD and the World Bank in 2008-2009. The BEEPS contain
4See Adams (1999) for more details.
5Energy expenses are obtained by adding total annual costs of electricity and fossil fuel,
whereas total variable cost also includes costs of raw materials and intermediate goods, com-
munications services and water.
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cross-sectional information on a representative sample of ﬁrms of Eastern Europe
and Central Asia (29 countries in the last round). The survey covers a large
set of topics, including corruption, access to ﬁnance, crime, justice and ﬁrm
performances measures. Unfortunately, we cannot use previous rounds of the
survey because they do not contain needed information about ﬁrms' energy
expenses.
In table A2, we report summary statistics of the main variables used in our
regressions based on the last round (2008-2009) of the BEEPS. The enterprise
information concerns the year 2007. Using observations for which we have com-
plete data, the ﬁnal sample contains more than 1200 observations over 22 ECA
countries. The list of countries is provided in table A1. Finally, several macroe-
conomic variables are used to control for potential nation-wide eﬀects and are
provided by WDI and EBRD transtion indicators.
We discuss in the next section the construction of our indicator of ﬁnancial
development at the local-level, before presenting in Section 4 estimation results
based on equation (4).
3 Indicator of Local Financial Development
To examine the eﬀect of ﬁnancial access on ﬁrms' energy consumption, we fo-
cus on ﬁnancial development at the local-level. We compute a local indicator
by relying on ﬁrms' self-reported ﬁnacial access constraint. There are several
advantages of using, in our regressions, a regional indicator of ﬁnancial devel-
opment, instead of the direct answer. First, companies whose report may be
constrained by access to ﬁnance are more likely to need ﬁnancing. This is gen-
erally the case for the most productive growing ﬁrms. And we can expect those
companies to be more energy eﬃcient. This implies a downward bias of the
impact of access to ﬁnancial markets on energy consumption, the less energy
intensive ﬁrms declaring to be constrained by external funding needs. On the
other hand, energy intensive ﬁrms might plausibly be less productive overall. If
the ﬁnancial market is able to detect ﬁrms' productivity levels, we can expect
the less energy eﬃcient ﬁrms to get a lower access to external ﬁnance. Uneasy
access to ﬁnancing is also more binding for small and younger ﬁrms. So, using
the direct measure of access to ﬁnancial markets implies restricting the analysis
on small and young businesses, which are more energy intensive. The direct
approach might therefore have an important endogeneity bias (downward and
upward) with our dependant variable. Nevertheless, information reported by
ﬁrms is still a valid measure of the variation of inter-regional access to ﬁnance.
In addition, the database used to construct regional indicators is much larger,
which enhances the quality of the estimated coeﬃcients.
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In order to build our local indicator of ﬁnancial development, we follow a two
step procedure inspired by the seminal paper of Guiso et al. (2004). Distin-
guishing diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development between diﬀerent regions of Italy,
their paper highlights the positive impact of the development of local ﬁnancial
markets on several microeconomic variables (competition, entry of new ﬁrms,
growth). This approach estimates regional ﬁnancial development indicators by
adding individual subjective assessments of ﬁnancial obstacle in order to ob-
tain regional scores. Normalizing those regional dummies allows to have a good
proxy for regional ﬁnancial development. We expect this measure to catch the
ability of the local ﬁnancial system to grant ﬁrms easier access to external ﬁ-
nance. This method has been used by Villegas-Sanchez (2009) to highlight the
role of local ﬁnancial markets in externalities conveyed by foreign direct invest-
ments in Mexico. We assume that the ﬁnancial access can be described by the
following econometric equation:
FinancialAccessi = α0 + α1Xi + γRegionk +Dj +Dt + i (5)
where FinancialAccessi is a dummy variable denoting the ﬁnancial access of
ﬁrm i. This dummy equals to 1 if a ﬁrm reports that ﬁnancial access is no,
minor or moderate obstacle to its current operations, and 0 otherwise (very
severe or a major obstacle). The variable of interest is the set of region
ﬁxed eﬀects Regionk, which should capture the ﬁnancial development at the
regional level. X is a vector of ﬁrm speciﬁc attributes that might explain the
enterprise's response. In this last equation we also include year and 2-digit
industry dummies respectively indexed by t and j. This allows us to control
for unobserved year-speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc factors that impact on the
dependent variable.
To compute our indicator of local ﬁnancial development we use the surveys of
2002 and 2005 of the BEEPS. In both surveys each ﬁrm is asked to rank to
what extent ﬁnancial access is a binding constraint for its current operations.
Moreover, both surveys contain information about the region where is located
each ﬁrm. This variable enables us to compute a local variable of ﬁnancial
development. An interesting characteristic of the BEEPS is that regions are
used as strata in the sampling design, so surveys aim to be representative at the
regional level. The geographical area of a given region is based on the ﬁrst-level
oﬃcial administrative boundaries. When oﬃcial boundary is too disaggregated,
diﬀerent administrative regions are grouped for stratiﬁcation purposes of the
survey. Each country is subdivided in six regions on average, from four regions
in Slovenia to nine in the Czech Republic. Overall, the original sample contains
141 identiﬁed regions.
On average, each region contains over 80 observations.6 It should be noticed that
we limit our calculations to regions with a minimum of 20 observations in order
6Summary statistics at the regional level computed from BEEPS 2002 and 2005 rounds
are available upon request.
8
to limit potential biases due to undersized regions. For the same reason we stack
up the data from the 2002 and 2005 surveys. This aggregation seems ﬁtting as
there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the way both surveys were implemented.
Table II provides ﬁrm-level descriptive statistics in both surveys as well as some
regional statistics of the sampled ﬁrms. Overall, we can see in panels A and B
that ﬁrms surveyed in 2002 and 2005 display similar characteristics. The only
sizeable diﬀerence concerns the mean number of employees. It seems that in
2005 the surveyed ﬁrms are smaller on average. An important feature concerns
the ﬁnancial access dummy, which seems to be stable between 2002 and 2005.
Table II: Summary statistics
Panel A: ﬁrm level sample: BEEPS 2002
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum N
Financial access dummy 0.782 0.413 0 1 5810
Capacity utilization 80.408 20.062 1 100 6000
Number of employees 139.483 498.235 2 9960 6122
Firm age 14.701 18.703 3 202 6153
Exporter 0.243 0.429 0 1 6122
State ownership 14.887 33.908 0 100 5764
Foreign ownership 13.224 30.824 0 100 5770
Panel B: ﬁrm level sample: BEEPS 2005
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum N
Financial access dummy 0.775 0.418 0 1 9950
Capacity utilization 80.898 20.389 4 100 10278
Number of employees 95.114 341.439 1 9900 10073
Firm age 15.941 17.017 0 180 10409
Exporter 0.265 0.441 0 1 10408
State ownership 7.611 25.561 0 100 10421
Foreign ownership 8.238 25.33 0 100 10421
Panels A and B report summary statistics for ﬁrms surveyed respectively in the BEEPS 2002 and
the BEEPS 2005 rounds. Financial access dummy equal to one if a ﬁrm reports that ﬁnance is "no",
"minor" or "moderate" obstacle to its current operations, and zero otherwise ("major" or "very
severe" obstacle). Capacity utilization is the share of the current output in comparison with the
maximum output possible. Number of employees is the number of full-time employees. Firm age is
the diﬀerence between the year a ﬁrm was surveyed and the year it began its operations in the sur-
veyed country. Exporter is a dummy equal to one if a ﬁrm exports any output in a foreign country.
State and foreign ownerships are a ﬁrm's percentages owned respectively by government/State and
private foreign company(s).
We estimate in table III the response probability of the likelihood that access
to ﬁnance is not a binding constraint for a company.7
7For ease of interpretation Guiso et al. (2004) have used linear probability models. But as
we are not interested in the pure interpretation of this ﬁrst step coeﬃcients, but instead on
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Table III: First Step Estimation of Individual Financial Access
Capacity utilization 0.006***
(7.04)
Log number employees 0.083***
(6.45)
Firm age -0.001
(0.73)
Exporter 0.020
(0.44)
State ownership -0.181***
(2.92)
Foreign ownership 0.270***
(4.46)
Region dummies Yes
Year dummy Yes
2-digit dummies Yes
Observations 8,539
Pseudo R2 0.099
The dependent variable is ﬁnancial access dummy, equal to one if a ﬁrm reports that
ﬁnance is "no", "minor" or "moderate" obstacle to its current operations, and zero
otherwise ("major" or "very severe" obstacle). Capacity utilization is the share of the
current output in comparison with the maximum output possible. Number of employ-
ees is the number of full-time employees. Firm age is the diﬀerence between the year
a ﬁrm was surveyed and the year it began its operations in the surveyed country. Ex-
porter is a dummy equal to one if a ﬁrm exports any output in a foreign country.
State and foreign ownerships are a ﬁrm's percentages owned respectively by govern-
ment/State and private foreign company(s). Region dummies are a set of dummies for
each separate region where the surveyed ﬁrm is located. Reference region is Vojvod-
ina, in Serbia, displaying the lower regional coeﬃcient of ﬁnancial access. Year dummy
is a dummy equal to one if the year of survey is 2004. 2-digit dummies are industry
dummies, disaggregated at 2 digits level. Standard errors reported in brackets are ro-
bust and clustered by country-industry. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance levels of 10, 5
and 1%, respectively.
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The econometric speciﬁcation of the ﬁrm-level determinants of ﬁnancial access
is based on the paper of Beck et al. (2006). Our dependent variable is equal
to 1 if the ﬁrm declares not to be constrained by the access to ﬁnance. We
include industry dummies to control for sector-speciﬁc characteristics possibly
inﬂuencing ﬁrms' ﬁnancing access. Firms facing a more sustained demand,
as captured by capacity utilization variable, seem to be less constrained by
ﬁnancial access. As expected, the number of employees enter signiﬁcantly, larger
ﬁrms report signiﬁcantly higher ﬁnancial access. The ownership structure seems
also to be important in predicting ﬁrms' ﬁnancing constraints. Foreign-owned
companies report higher access to ﬁnance, while state-owned enterprises face
lower access to ﬁnance. This set of results is consistent with ﬁndings of Beck et
al. (2006). The only diﬀerence is that reported ﬁnancing access does not seem
to be signiﬁcantly related to the age and the exporter status of the ﬁrm. But
the result of the age variable, which has no signiﬁcant eﬀect, may be explained
by poorer performances of ﬁrms created before the USSR collapse. In addition,
to their control variables, we have included in our estimate regional dummies,
capturing ﬁnancial development diﬀerences across diﬀerent regions inside each
country.
Our variable of interest is Region. Indeed, the measure of local ﬁnancial ac-
cess will be the ranking provided by the coeﬃcient γ of the region k. Regions
where ﬁnancial markets are more developed are those where access to market
ﬁnancing is easier. If local caracteristics of ﬁnancial markets do not matter,
then the probability to report a good ﬁnancial access should not be signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀected by regional dummies. Table IV shows the top ten (Panel A) and
the lowest ten (Panel B) regions ranking according to their dummy coeﬃcient
estimate. Comparing to the reference region (Vojvodina, in Serbia) all other
local dummies display a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient.8 This supports our
assumption of wide cross-region diﬀerences in ﬁnancial access across our sam-
ple. As highlighted in Panel A, regions with highest local ﬁnancial system are
located in EU zone, despite that estimations are driven on surveys conducted
before the 2004 enlargement of the EU to the eight Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries (CEEC) of our sample. Some countries, in particular Poland,
display a lower ﬁnancial development indicator than we would expect, thus in-
dicating more diﬃcult access to external funds by ﬁrms in these regions.9 As
shown in Panel B, the lowest ﬁnanically developed regions are located in Serbia,
Georgia and Belarus. These countries are those which experienced the lowest
ﬁnancial depth and banking intermediation in the ﬁrst half of the 2000' decade
(see EBRD Transition Report 2012). Even if on average regions in EU show
the relative magnitude of these coeﬃcients, we do prefer using a probit model.
8Except two of them (South East Serbia and Vitebskaya), which are not statistically diﬀer-
ent from Vojvodina at the usual signiﬁcancy levels. Nevertheless, setting coeﬃcients of these
regions to zero does not change the magnitude or the statistical signiﬁcance of our estimations.
9The study of Brown et al. (2006) also reports that over 24 transition countries, Poland
has the lower ease of ﬁnancing. Mainly because of low quality of the credit registry and low
credit information sharing leading to a bad identiﬁcation of risky loans.
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slightly higher local ﬁnancial development, the correlation is not very high (less
than 0.3) implying that our estimated eﬀect should not be uniquely driven by
ﬁnancial underdevelopment of non-EU zone compared to EU area.
We transform our regional coeﬃcients into indicator varying between 0 and 1,
indicating ﬁnancial development. Therefore, to facilitate the interpretation, we
normalize the regional dummy coeﬃcients as follows:
LFDk =
γk
max(γk)
(6)
with LFDk the Local Financial Development in region k and γk the coeﬃcient
of the region dummy k.
We build our local ﬁnancial indicator using exclusively the BEEPS of 2002
and 2005 rounds. As there is a very small number of overlapping ﬁrms in the
diﬀerent rounds of this survey,10 this allows us to compute a lagged indicator
based on completely diﬀerent set of observations. Another important advantage
is that, compared to the 2008-2009 round of BEEPS, previous surveys are not
aﬀected by the global ﬁnancial crisis started in 2007. Due to international
ﬁnancial contagion, the transmission of the crisis should be higher in regions
where ﬁnancial system is more integrated and/or vulnerable to international
ﬁnancial ﬂows. In these regions, ﬁnancial shrunk was probably felt as being the
most severe. We want to examine the inﬂuence of an easier access to ﬁnancial
funds on energy intensity, and not the eﬀect of eﬃciency or stability of local
ﬁnancial institutions. Taking into account the 2008-2009 round of BEEPS will
alter our measure of local ﬁnancial access with this last mechanism. This is
an additional reason why we do not use in our regressions the direct individual
answer about the ﬁnancial constraint of ﬁrms. Using ﬁnancial access information
reported in previous surveys make our local ﬁnancial development measure clean
of a potential global crisis eﬀect.
As LFD is estimated from a preliminary procedure, we need to ensure this vari-
able complies with standard statistical properties. Thus, to make test statistics
asymptotically valid in the second stage procedure, we need to compute an
adjustment to the common variance matrix estimate that accounts for the vari-
ability in the estimated coeﬃcients of the generated regressor (see Wooldridge,
2002, p.115-116). We use a popular resampling method, i.e. bootstrapping, for
obtaining standards errors, conﬁdence intervals and p-values for test statistics.
Before analyzing the results of our estimations, we look at the conditional distri-
bution of energy intensity over our local ﬁnancial development indicator. Figure
I indicates the distribution of energy intensity for the lower values of ﬁnancial
development (the 25% of the worst ﬁnancially developed regions) and the higher
10In our ﬁnal sample, less than 1% of ﬁrms were surveyed in a previous BEEPS round.
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Table IV: Local Financial Development - LFD
Panel A: Top 10 LFD
Region Country Regional dummy Local Financial
coeﬃcient Development indicator
Stredne Slovensko Slovakia 1.9565789 1
Ústecký Czech Republic 1.8702239 .9558643
Slavonia Croatia 1.8515556 .946323
Ural Russia 1.8510218 .9460501
Zemgale Latvia 1.7988949 .9194083
Volgo-Vyatskiy Russia 1.7555416 .8972505
Riga Latvia 1.7482936 .8935462
South West Lithuania 1.7401197 .8893685
Bratislava Slovakia 1.6728901 .8550077
Bud¥jovický Czech Republic 1.6495848 .8430964
Panel B: Lowest 10 LFD
Region Country Regional dummy Local Financial
coeﬃcient Development indicator
Eastern Poland .56113099 .2867919
Sud-Est Romania .51804234 .2647694
South Ukraine .48711365 .2489619
Belgrade Serbia .47592015 .243241
Southern Poland .45479062 .2324417
Central Poland .43259019 .2210952
Shida Kartli Georgia .19450514 .0994108
Vitebskaya Belarus .19297881 .0986307
South East Serbia Serbia .16503302 .0843477
Vojvodina Serbia 0 0
The regional dummy coeﬃcient is obtained from a probit estimation of the equation (5) using BEEPS
2002 and 2005. The Local Financial Development indicator is the normalized measure of ﬁnancial
development computed as in (6). Panel A shows the ten regions displaying highest coeﬃcients for
ﬁnancial access estimation, whereas Panel B shows the ten regions with the lowest coeﬃcients. Re-
gions are ranked in the descending order.
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values of ﬁnancial development indicator (the 25% of the most ﬁnancially de-
veloped regions). We can clearly see that the kernel distribution of energy con-
sumption for the quartile of the less ﬁnancially developped regions shifts on the
right side compared to more ﬁnancially developped regions. Overall, this ﬁgure
shows that energy intensity is lower when the local ﬁnancial access is higher. In
the next section (Section 4), we examine extensively our econometric results on
the link between local ﬁnancial development and ﬁrms' energy intensity.
Figure 1: Energy intensity (log deviation from industry mean) and local ﬁnancial
development
Firm-level energy intensity is expressed as the log deviation from industry (2-digit) mean
value. LFD is our normalized measure of ﬁnancial development by region, over the period
2002-2005 (cf. Section 4). The ﬁgure displays the kernel density plots of energy intensity,
expressed as energy cost over total variable cost, for the sample of ﬁrms with local ﬁnancial
development (LFD) at the top quartile (more ﬁnancially developed regions) and in the lower
quartile (less ﬁnancially developed regions).
4 The Role of Local Financial Development on
Energy Intensity
In this section, we discuss in details our regression results, corresponding to
Tables 5 to 8. We ﬁrst present our benchmark regression and test the impact
of Local Financial Development (LFD) on manufacturing ﬁrms' energy inten-
sity(4.1). In the following subsection (4.2), we investigate whether ﬁrm size
matters. In the third subsection (4.3), we present the country ﬁnancial devel-
opment and how it aﬀects the energy intensity. In the last two subsections,
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we do some robustness checks: changing our baseline speciﬁcation (4.4), intro-
ducing regional ﬁxed eﬀects and controlling for endogeneity using instrumental
variables (4.5).
4.1 Energy Intensity and Local Financial Development
(LFD): Benchmark regressions
We now turn to the econometric estimation of our core model (4), using en-
ergy intensity as dependent variable. Table V reports the results. The ﬁrst
column presents estimation of our baseline speciﬁcation, controlling for basic
ﬁrm characteristics and including country and 2-digit industry dummies to take
into account for cross-country and cross-industry heterogeneity in our sample.
Control variables included in the estimations but not reported in the table con-
cern ﬁrm age, share of employees with degree as well as an indicator of ﬁrm
performance, i.e. total sales growth over the last three years. The coeﬃcient of
interest αLFD is the coeﬃcient of the LFD variable. A negative coeﬃcient im-
plies that in more ﬁnancially developed regions the ﬁrm-level energy intensity is
lower, and this eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at 5 percent level. This ﬁrst result
conﬁrms our testing assumption, the eﬀect of local ﬁnacial market signiﬁcantly
inﬂuences ﬁrm's energy demand. The magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient is
also economically signiﬁcant. At the sample mean of energy intensity (0.09),
an improving of the local ﬁnancial development from the bottom quartile (the
25% of less ﬁnancially developed regions) to the top quartile (the 25% of more
ﬁnancially developed regions), corresponding to an increase in LFD of 0.293,
predicts a 14 percentage points decrease in energy intensity.11 As expected, co-
eﬃcients of capital and labour are positive and signiﬁcant, implying that capital
and labour increase the factor intensity of energy. Whereas the negative and
1 percent signiﬁcant eﬀect of output provides evidence of economies of scale in
the use of energy.
A ﬁrst concern is that in densely populated regions, one might expect to ﬁnd
higher concentration of bank branches, which could improve ﬁnancial access
of ﬁrms located in these areas. Therefore, even if the ease of ﬁnancing is not
limited to the number of branches available in a given region, our indicator
may be potentially correlated with local population density. And, as shown in
Morikawa (2012), ﬁrms' energy intensity may be negatively correlated to popu-
lation density. In order to ensure that the eﬀect of local ﬁnancial development
is not uniquely driven by a population eﬀect, Column 2 considers the same
speciﬁcation inserting dummies for locality size. The coeﬃcient of LFD is al-
most identical and remains signiﬁcant at 5 percent level. Financial development
11The estimated eﬀect is given by: 100*(-0.043*0.293)/0.09 = 14%, where 0.043 is the
coeﬃcient of the local ﬁnancial development indicator in Table V column 1 and 0.293 is the
interquartile range of this indicator; 0.09 is the sample mean of energy intensity, see Table
A2.
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still negatively aﬀects ﬁrm-level energy intensity once we control for the size of
population in the locality.
A large literature on transition economies underlines the positive impact of de
novo private ownership on ﬁrm performance (Fisher, 2000). As for many other
aspects, de novo companies should be more energy eﬃcient compared to state
and privatised enterprises. At the same time ﬁnancial institutions may be more
prone to grant de novo ﬁrms easier access to external ﬁnance. As Column
3 shows, private from start-up ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly less energy intensive than
other forms of establishment, particularly in comparison to formerly state owned
ﬁrms. Although this eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant, it does not aﬀect the ﬁnancial
access impact on energy intensity. The magnitude and the signiﬁcance of LFD is
unchanged compared to the previous regression implying low partial correlation
between local ﬁnancial development and ﬁrm establishment form. Speciﬁcation
of Column 3 represents our preferred benchmark speciﬁcation.
Columns 4 and 5 show the basic results when changing the assumption for tech-
nology heterogeneity among ﬁrms. Column 4 replaces 2-digit industry dummies
by 4-digit industry dummies. Whereas 4-digit industry dummies should be able
to capture more precisely the technology diﬀerences in energy use across the
same 2-digit sector, we cannot apply bootstrapping due to dataset limitation.12
Despite the high number of additional explanatory variables, the coeﬃcient of
LFD is reinforced. Its magnitude is higher and it is now signiﬁcant at 1 per-
cent level, thus implying that local ﬁnancial development is partially correlated
with ﬁrms' specialisation in energy intensive sub-sectors. Some energy intensive
industries beneﬁt from a better access to ﬁnancial markets than other sectors,
partly compensating the overall negative impact of ﬁnancial development on
energy demand. Column 5 includes 2-digit industry dummies diﬀerentiated by
country (interactions between 2-digit industry dummies and country dummies)
in order to take into account for potential technology diﬀerences across ﬁrms in
same sector but in diﬀerent countries. As in previous regression this implies a
large number of explanatory variables added to the basic estimation which lim-
its the use of bootstrapping. Coeﬃcient of LFD is signiﬁcant and slightly more
negative than in Column 3 implying that in some countries access to ﬁnancial
market is easier for energy intensive sectors.
In Column 6 we introduce three macroeconomic controls. Hence, we include
in our regression GDP per capita  as proxy for country development level 
inﬂation and country-level energy intensity. While its overcontrolling, we want
to ensure that our indicator is not aﬀected by nationwide heterogeneity not
captured by country dummies. We ﬁnd the expected eﬀects of macroeconomic
variables. Manufacturing sector in more developed countries consume signiﬁ-
cantly less energy to produce. The negative sign of the coeﬃcient of inﬂation
suggests that energy prices increase relatively more than other costs. Country
12We include 4-digit industry dummies when it is computationally possible and when there
is no need for bootstrapping.
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energy intensity is not signiﬁcant because its eﬀect is well captured by country
dummies. Introduction of these controls only marginally impacts the coeﬃcient
of LFD, which remains almost unchanged compared to Column 3.
Finally, one potential objection is that the estimated eﬀect is driven by EU
vs. non-EU diﬀerence, even if part of the diﬀerence should be the contrast in
ﬁnancial markets. EU countries should have more ﬁnancially developped mar-
kets, potentially less segmented and more eﬃcient, and hence potentially more
able to provide ﬁnancial supply to cost-eﬀective energy saving investments. In
Column 7 we introduce an EU dummy in our regression. The EU new members
(since 2004 and until 2007) are on average signiﬁcantly less energy intensive
compared to non-EU members, but the eﬀect of LFD remains very stable com-
pared to previous regressions. To test the assumption that the LFD eﬀect is
aﬀecting diﬀerently ﬁrms' energy intensity in EU compared to non-EU zone,
we introduce in column 8 the interaction between our LFD indicator and the
EU dummy. However, the coeﬃcient of the interaction term is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Results of Column 8 do not support any signiﬁcant diﬀrence
between EU and non-EU countries in the impact of LFD on energy intensity.
Overall, results of Table 5 support our assumption of a negative impact of ﬁnan-
cial development on ﬁrm-level energy consumption. Limited access to supply of
ﬁnancial funds seems to limit ﬁrm's ability to undertake energy saving invest-
ments, and thus provides an explanation of the maintaining of highly elevated
levels of energy consummed in the ECA region. Nevertheless, if local ﬁnancial
development matters, than its impact should be lower for ﬁrms in less need of
external funds. As shown in the literature,13 the eﬀect of local ﬁnancial develop-
ment should be non-linear, smaller ﬁrms being more aﬀected by local ﬁnancial
conditions. We try to test this proposition in the subsequent subsection.
4.2 Does Firm Size Matter?
As pointed out by previous literature, ﬁrms should not be equally aﬀected by ﬁ-
nancial access at the local-level. Smaller ﬁrms should be more heavily dependent
of available sources of ﬁnance in their region than larger ﬁrms. Several intu-
itive and theoretical arguments may explain this. First, larger ﬁrms have higher
internal capacities to draw funds from a broad geographical area. Then, imper-
fect information and the relied transaction costs should be lower for banks when
dealing with large companies (Petersen and Rajan, 2002). Reliable information
may be of easier access and less costly (available balance sheets, independent au-
dit, etc.). Moral hazard should be lower because of potential prior relationships
(Berger et al., 2005). Finally, due to economies of scale banking transaction
costs should decrease proportionately to the borrowed amount. So, lending cost
should be lower for larger ﬁrms (Fafchamps and Schündeln, 2013).
13See Fafchamps and Schündeln (2013) for a discussion of this topic.
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Table VI: The Diﬀerential Eﬀect of Local Financial Development: Does ﬁrm
size matter?
Less than More than Non-linear Country Fin. Dev. vs. Non-linear
47 46 Eﬀect Local Fin. Dvt. Eﬀects
employees employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LFD -0.064*** -0.029 -0.116*** -0.056*** -0.130***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.043) (0.016) (0.050)
LFD x (log labour) 0.018* 0.022*
(0.011) (0.012)
Private credit/GDP -0.003*** -0.002* -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Private credit/GDP -0.000**
x (log labour) (0.000)
Log output -0.024*** -0.009* -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log capital 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004** 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log labour 0.023*** 0.014 0.006 0.008* 0.015*** 0.015**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Private de novo -0.010 -0.023** -0.017** -0.010 -0.017*** -0.015**
(0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-digit dummies Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
4-digit dummies No No No Yes Yes No
Observations 618 643 1,261 2,121 1,164 1,165
R2 0.216 0.210 0.171 0.213 0.310 0.181
The left-hand side variable is a measure of the ﬁrm-level demand for energy, expressed as the ratio of energy cost over total vari-
able cost. Following the BEEPS (2009) deﬁnition, small and medium ﬁrms have less than 100 employees and large ﬁrms more
than 99 employees. LFD is our normalized measure of ﬁnancial development by region, over the period 2002-2005 (cf. Section
4). LFD*log labour is an interaction term between the local ﬁnancial development variable and a proxy for the ﬁrm size, i.e.
log of the number of employees. Private credit/GDP is domestic credit to private sector as percent of GDP and Private credit x
(log labour) is an interaction term between private credit/GDP and log of the number of employees. Output is measured by the
total sales, capital by the net book value of the capital and labour by the number of full-time employees. Private de novo, private
subsidy of public company, joint-venture with foreign partner and other type of establishment are dummies capturing the way the
ﬁrm was established (the last three dummy variables are included in the estimations but not reported in the table). The reference
group is composed of former and actual state-owned companies. Firm controls are a set of variables capturing ﬁrm characteristics:
age of the ﬁrm, share of employees with degree and the sales performance of the ﬁrm over the last three years (log of the ratio
of total sales during the last ﬁscal year to sales three years ago). Locality size controls are a set of ﬁve dummies capturing the
size of locality.2-digit dummies and 4-digit dummies are industry dummies, disaggregated respectively at 2 and 4 digit. Robust
standard errors clustered by country-industry are reported in brackets in columns 1, 2 and 4. In columns 3, 5 and 6 are reported,
in brackets, non-parametric robust bootstrapped standard errors (2000 replications). *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance levels of 10,
5 and 1%, respectively.
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In Table VI, we keep our benchmark regression (from the Table V, Column
3) and we check whether the eﬀect of local ﬁnancial development is stronger
for smaller ﬁrms. For this purpose we split our sample according to the ﬁrm
size. If local ﬁnancial conditions matter, than they should mostly aﬀect smaller
ﬁrms. In order to keep the same statistical power we divide our sample into
two equal subsamples (Columns 1 and 2).14 Column 1 displays the estimation
results for ﬁrms with less than 47 employees. The coeﬃcient of LFD is negative
and strongly signiﬁcant (at 1 percent level). By comparison, in Column 2 the
sample is composed of half of the sample with larger companies (i.e. with more
than 46 employees). For larger ﬁrms, the eﬀect of local ﬁnancial development
is not signiﬁcant, thus conﬁrming our assumption that energy consumption of
smaller enterprises is more strongly impacted by local ﬁnacial conditions.
To directly test the U-shaped relationship between the eﬀect of local ﬁnancial
conditions on energy intensity and ﬁrm size, we introduce in our benchmark
regression an interaction between ﬁrm size and our LFD variable (Column 3). A
positive coeﬃcient of the interaction variable will thus corroborate that smaller
ﬁrms beneﬁt proportionnately more from local sources of ﬁnance to improve
their energy eﬃciency. Results support previous ﬁndings. The impact of LFD
on ﬁrm demand for energy is strictly negative and highly signiﬁcant for smaller
ﬁrms, but the eﬀect is that much less important as ﬁrm size increases. For small
ﬁrms, local access to external ﬁnance is crucial for energy savings.
The interaction term also allows to quantify, according to the ﬁrm size, when
the impact of local ﬁnancial development has no more a statistically negative
inﬂuence on ﬁrm energy intensity. The eﬀect of LFD on ﬁrms' energy demand,
given by - 0.116 + 0.018*(log labour), is strictly negative for ﬁrms with less
than 629 employees.15 This represents a major share of ﬁrms included in our
data (around 95%). Coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst three columns of Table VI have the
expected eﬀects. As might be anticipated, only very large ﬁrms seem to not be
constrained by local ﬁnancial supply conditions to ﬁnance their cost-eﬀective
energy eﬃcient investments.
4.3 Local Financial Development vs. Country Financial
Development
So far, we have shown that an increased access to local ﬁnance is a key factor to
enhance energy performances of ﬁrms, especially when ﬁrms are of smaller size.
Since our data cover several countries, it is important to ascertain that our local
ﬁnancial development eﬀect on energy intensity is not simply reﬂecting country
diﬀerences in ﬁnancial depth. Furthermore, we can directly compare eﬀects of
14Results are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected if subsamples are constructed using the BEEPS
methodology for ﬁrm size (less than 100 employees for small and medium enterprises).
15The number of employees is given by e0.116/0.018 = 629.
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nationwide ﬁnancial access agaist local ﬁnancial development. Indeed, large
ﬁrms should be more able to take advantage of countrywide ﬁnancing opportu-
nities than do smaller businesses. The cross-country nature of our sample allows
to assess, for diﬀerent ﬁrm sizes, what is the more appropriate scope of ﬁnancial
market (local-level vs. country-level) to improve ﬁrms' energy eﬃciency.
Column 4 of Table VI, reestimates our benchmark regression including a rather
standard proxy for country level ﬁnancial development, i.e. domestic credit pro-
vided to private sector (as percent of GDP). This brings further evidence about
the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on ﬁrm-level energy intensity. An increase
of the variable Private credit/GDP signiﬁcantly decreases ﬁrm-level energy in-
tensity. Moreover, as regressions include country ﬁxed eﬀects, we can state that
the ﬁnancial development eﬀect on energy consumption is not driven by the
construction of our LFD indicator.
In Column 5, we include in the regression both indicators of ﬁnancial develop-
ment at the country as well as at the local levels. Whereas the signiﬁcance and
the magnitude of the Private credit/GDP coeﬃcient decreases in both columns,
the coeﬃcient of LFD remains very similar to Column 3 of Table V (our bench-
mark regression). LFD eﬀect on energy intensity is still negative and dominates
the country ﬁnancial development eﬀect. This supports the idea that our esti-
mated eﬀect of local ﬁnancial development on energy intensity does not simply
reﬂect cross-country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial depth.16
Finally, the last column of Table VI shows that an improvement of credit supply
at the national level aﬀects small ﬁrms mainly through local ﬁnancial markets.
Indeed, the variable of country ﬁnancial development alone is statistically not
signiﬁcant, whereas the coeﬃcient of LFD is negative and signiﬁcant at 1 per-
cent level. The LFD indicator interacted with the number of employees is still
positive, indicating a decreasing magnitude of the eﬀect of local ﬁnancial de-
velopment with ﬁrm size (as in Column 3). By contrast, an interesting result
concerns the negative sign of the interaction between country level ﬁnancial
development and ﬁrm size (Private credit/GDP x (log labour)). The eﬀect of
countrywide credit market depth decreases that much more energy intensity as
ﬁrm size increases.17 This seems to suggest that larger ﬁrms are more able to
seize broader ﬁnancing opportunities to ﬁnance energy eﬃciency investments.
Although our regional splitting do not provide a breakdown of equivalent ge-
ographical size in each country, the data seem to conﬁrm that for small ﬁrms
local access to external ﬁnance is crucial for energy saving. Results of Column 6
16It should be noticed that the correlation between our local ﬁnancial development indicator
and Private credit/GDP variable is around 0.3, implying that our variable of local ﬁnancial
development is more about regional ease of credit access than it is about the absolute quantity
of credit supplied in the region.
17Changing our variable of country ﬁnancial development, using the bank credit over GDP,
maintain almost unchanged results for the LFD variable comparing to Table VI.
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make possible the comparison between eﬀects of local ﬁnancial development and
country ﬁnancial development. By normalizing the variable Private credit/GDP
as we did for our indicator of local ﬁnancial development (see Section 3, equation
(6)), we can directly assess at what ﬁrm size the eﬀect of country ﬁnancial mar-
ket deepness surpasses the impact of local ﬁnancial market.18 Figure II provides
the marginal impact on energy intensity of both local and country (normalized)
ﬁnancial development indicators, conditional to ﬁrm-level number of employees.
From this ﬁgure we can see that the eﬀect of country ﬁnancial development out-
reach the eﬀect of LFD when ﬁrm size exceeds the threshold of twenty employees.
Our data seems to indicate that improvements of local ﬁnancial conditions have
a greater eﬀect on small ﬁrms' energy consumption, whereas nation-wide credit
supply expansion (as expressed by the level of Private credit/GDP) has higher
inﬂuence on medium and large ﬁrms' energy demand.
Figure 2: Firm size conditional eﬀect of local vs. country ﬁnancial markets
The conditional eﬀect of Local Financial Development is obtained by: −0.13 + 0.022 ∗
log(numberofemployees). The conditional eﬀect of Country Financial Development is ob-
tained by: −0.022 ∗ log(numberofemployees).
From an economic policy point of view this is an interesting and unexplored
ﬁnding. Our estimation suggests that an active ﬁnancial policy to improve
small ﬁrms' energy performances is more eﬀective when channeled through local
18We normalize the country ﬁnancial development as follows:
PrivateCredit/GDPj
max(PrivateCredit/GDPj)
(7)
Where j denotes for country. Replacing this rescaled variable of Private Credit/GDP in the
regression of Table VI, Column 6, provides a coeﬃcient of -0.022 for the "Private Credit/GDP
x (log labour)" variable.
22
ﬁnancial structures. Whereas energy eﬃciency improvements of larger ﬁrms
(from twenty employees and more) may be higher with an overall deepness of
credit supply at the country-level. These results also seem to indicate that
an overall enhancement of the ﬁnancial market functionning, in particular by
limiting geographical segmentation of the market, should have a positive impact
on ﬁrms' energy saving investments.
4.4 Energy intensity and Local Financial Development:
Alternative Speciﬁcations
In order to check for the robustness of our results, in Table VII we change our
benchmark speciﬁcation, using alternative speciﬁcations and diﬀerent proxies
for our endogenous variable. First, we carry out our benchmark regression
again, but without capital and/or labour (Columns 1 and 2) to follow the basic
speciﬁcation of Bloom et al. (2010). We run these estimations including 4-
digit level industry dummies, to be more able to take into account for capital
and labour heterogeneity across ﬁrms. Results remain signiﬁcant and close in
magnitude to our benchmark regressions. In Column 3 we present energy share
in logarithm. For all the regressions we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and negative impact
of LFD on the various energy dependent variables.
In column 4, the dependent variable is the ratio of energy expenditure over
gross output (measured by total sales) including the independent variables of our
benchmark regressions (Table V). Some recent papers, as Bloom et al. (2010) or
Morikawa (2012), use as proxy for energy intensity the share of energy expenses
over total revenues. This speciﬁcation is relevant under perfect competition,
since total cost will be equal to total sales. If this assumption does not hold
total revenue will be equal to marginal cost plus a markup. Under imperfect
competition, changes in energy share over total sales may also be driven by
changes in market power. Still, results in Column 4 support ﬁndings from our
benchmark regressions. The magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient is somewhat
lower with this alternative speciﬁcation, indicating partial correlation between
our variable of local ﬁnancial development and ﬁrm's markup. This result is in
line with Guiso et al. (2004) who show that local ﬁnancial development increase
competition among ﬁrms, thus reducing market power. All other things equal,
the decrease in markup decreases the denominator and increases the energy
share over total revenue. This speciﬁcation may partially hide the overall eﬀect
of ﬁnancial development on energy intensity.
Finally in Column 5, we present our results for a diﬀerent source of energy (fuel).
One of the major issue related to energy consumption, is its environmental
impact, in particular through air pollutant emissions of fossil fuel combustion
(Cole et al, 2008). To test whether local ﬁnancial development may inﬂuence
ﬁrm-level environmental performances we use fossil fuel intensity as dependent
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Table VII: Local Financial Development and Energy Intensity: Alternative spec-
iﬁcations
Energy Energy Log energy EE/GO Fuel share
share share share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LFD -0.041** -0.057*** -0.559*** -0.025* -0.025*
(0.047) (0.016) (0.204) (0.015) (0.014)
Log output -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.306*** -0.030*** -0.006***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.037) (0.006) (0.002)
Log capital 0.003* 0.073*** 0.004* 0.002*
(0.002) (0.024) (0.002) (0.001)
Log labour 0.201*** 0.028*** 0.004
(0.052) (0.006) (0.003)
Private de novo -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.266*** -0.012 -0.002
(0.006) (0.008) (0.096) (0.008) (0.005)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
2-digit dummies No No Yes No Yes
4-digit dummies Yes Yes No Yes No
Observations 1,553 1,262 1,244 1,312 1,261
R2 0.240 0.286 0.172 0.267 0.129
The dependent variable in the ﬁrst two columns is the ratio of energy expenditure over total variable
cost. Log energy share is the log of the ratio of energy cost over total variable cost. EE/GO is the
ratio of energy expenditure over gross output (measured by total sales). Fuel share is the ratio of fuel
cost over total variable cost. LFD - Local Financial Development is our normalized measure of ﬁ-
nancial development by region, over the period 2002-2005 (cf. Section 4). Output is measured by the
total sales, capital by the net book value of the capital and labour by the number of full-time employ-
ees. Private de novo, private subsidy of public company, joint-venture with foreign partner and other
type of establishment are dummies capturing the way the ﬁrm was established (the last three dummy
variables are included in the estimations but not reported in the table). The reference group is com-
posed of former and actual state-owned companies. Firm controls are a set of variables capturing ﬁrm
characteristics: age of the ﬁrm, share of employees with degree and the sales performance of the ﬁrm
over the last three years (log of the ratio of total sales during the last ﬁscal year to sales three years
ago). Locality size controls are a set of ﬁve dummies capturing the size of locality. 2-digit dummies and
4-digit dummies are industry dummies, disaggregated respectively at 2 and 4 digit. Non-parametric
bootstrapped standard errors (2000 replications) are reported in brackets in columns three and ﬁve. In
the rest of columns, standard errors reported in brackets are robust and clustered by country-industry.
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance levels of 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.
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variable. The coeﬃcient of LFD is negative and signiﬁcant, but somewhat lower
than previously.
Table VII results suggest that the impact of the LFD do not depend on the
deﬁnition of our energy dependent variable neither on the speciﬁcation of the
translog function. For all the regressions we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and negative
impact of LFD on the energy dependent variables.
4.5 Energy Intensity and Local Financial Development:
Dealing with endogeneity
We construct our LFD variable using diﬀerent ﬁrm's answers (compared to the
benchmark regression in Table V) and previous survey's years (see Section 3 of
the paper). Even though, we may have some endogeneity problems either due
to omitted variables or reverse causality. In Table VIII we try to adress both
endogeneity problems.
We ﬁrst use the methodology proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and used
by Guiso et al. (2004) for possible regional omitted variables. As a matter of fact
the LFD variable is constructed on the regional level and our results may be due
to other local factors apart from the ﬁnancial development. If we assume that
some ﬁrms may less beneﬁt from the local ﬁnancial development we can control
for local characteristics and see if it is still the case. As we expect large ﬁrm
to be less constrained by local ﬁnance, we control for the interaction between
ﬁrm size and LFD  this should have a positive impact on energy intensity.
In other words the negative eﬀect of the LFD on energy intensity is less and
less negative when the ﬁrm get larger. When we control for omitted regional
characteristics in Columns 1, 2 and 3, we still have the expected positive eﬀect
of our interaction variable. Results are similar to Table VI, and using ﬁrms'
gross output as measure of ﬁrm size (Column 2) does not aﬀect signiﬁcantly
previous ﬁndings.
Concerning the reverse causality issue, we use instrumental variables (in Columns
4, 5 and 6) to check if enterprises looking for energy savings ﬁnancing are not
generating the local ﬁnance development. Banks may also choose their location
according to the energy eﬃciency of local ﬁrms. In order to check if our LFD
eﬀect of energy consumption is not reverse we instrument our variable with
exogenous determinants of LFD. We use the number of banks over population
density and the interest rate spread at the country-level. Both variables should
capture a countrywide competition in the banking sector. We choose those vari-
ables because it is diﬃcult to assume that ﬁrm energy consumption can aﬀect
the spread or the number of banks for the whole country - furthermore for the
previous period (2002-2005). The spread had already been used, as an IV, by
Beck et al. (2005). We expect increased competition in the banking sector to
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Table VIII: Local Financial Development and Energy Intensity: Dealing with
omitted variables and reverse causality
Regional ﬁxed eﬀects: IVs: number of banks/pop. density,
interacting LFD and ﬁrm size interest rate spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LFD -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.079***
(0.022) (0.020) (0.021)
LFD x (log labour) 0.018* 0.023**
(0.010) (0.011)
LFD x (log output) 0.016*
(0.008)
Private credit/GDP -0.000
(0.001)
Private credit/GDP -0.000*
x (log labour) (0.000)
Log output -0.017*** -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log capital 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.005*** 0.005** 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log labour 0.006 0.015*** 0.015** 0.006* 0.006* 0.006
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Private de novo -0.019** -0.018** -0.017** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.021***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality size controls Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
2-digit dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
4-digit dummies No No No No No Yes
Region ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Observations 1,261 1,261 1,165 1,103 1,103 1,103
R2 0.219 0.219 0.238
F test of excluded
instruments 98.13*** 108.80*** 90.07***
Sargan-Hansen
stat (p-value) 0.190 0.727 0.365
The left-hand side variable is a measure of the ﬁrm-level demand for energy, expressed as the ratio of energy cost over total
variable cost. LFD - Local Financial Development is our normalized measure of ﬁnancial development by region, over the
period 2002-2005 (cf. Section 4), instrumented by country related variables. The IV uses as instruments the country number
of banks divided by population density and the lending rate minus the deposit rate in percentage (interest rate spread). Both
variables are averaged between 2002 and 2005. LFD x (log labour) is an interaction term between the local ﬁnancial devel-
opment variable and a proxy for the ﬁrm size, i.e. log of the number of employees. LFD x (log output) is an interaction
term between the local ﬁnancial development variable and an alternative proxy for the ﬁrm size, i.e. log of output. Private
credit/GDP is domestic credit to private sector as percent of GDP and Private credit x (log labour) is an interaction term
between private credit/GDP and log of the number of employees. Output is measured by the total sales, capital by the net
book value of the capital and labour by the number of full-time employees. Private de novo, private subsidy of public company,
joint-venture with foreign partner and other type of establishment are dummies capturing the way the ﬁrm was established
(the last three dummy variables are included in the estimations but not reported in the table). The reference group is com-
posed of former and actual state-owned companies. Firm controls are a set of variables capturing ﬁrm characteristics: age of
the ﬁrm, share of employees with degree and the sales performance of the ﬁrm over the last three years (log of the ratio of
total sales during the last ﬁscal year to sales three years ago). Locality size controls are a set of ﬁve dummies capturing the
size of locality. 2-digit dummies are industry dummies disaggregated at 2 digit. Robust standard errors clustered by country-
industry are reported in brackets in all the columns. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance levels of 10, 5 and 1%, respectively.
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improve ﬁnancial supply at the local level, and inﬂuence energy intensity only
through its eﬀect on local ﬁnancial conditions. Results of the usual tests for
instrumental variable aprroach strongly support these assumptions. Overall,
the negative impact of LFD on energy consumption remains very stable and
signiﬁcant.
5 Conclusions
Energy consumption is an ongoing issue for the long-term sustainability of an
economic system. Manufacturing sector is responsible of one third of the world
wide consumed energy and almost one half of the energy consumed in the ECA
region. Moreover, energy eﬃciency related literature emphasizes the existence
of a gap between the optimal level of energy-eﬃcient investments and the
current level of such investments. One of the suggested reasons concerns the
availability of ﬁnancial funds to make energy-saving investments.
Countries of Europe and Central Asia, among the world's leaders of energy in-
tensity, oﬀers fertile ground for improve energy eﬃciency. Regarding the overall
modernizing margins of their manufacturing sector, ﬁnancial constraints should
be of a great importance for ﬁrms operating in this region.
Therefore, our study focus on the ﬁnancial access explanation of manufacturing
ﬁrm-level energy intensity in twenty-wo post-communist countries in Europe and
Central Asia. Our ﬁndings support our main testing assumption that is ﬁnancial
access development is robustly associated with decreasing energy intensity.
We examine more speciﬁcally whether local ﬁnancial market development aﬀects
energy intensity. Results display two main ﬁndings. The ﬁrst is that local
ﬁnancial development is signiﬁcantly associated with lower energy use of ﬁrms
operating in the region. This eﬀect is not simply reﬂecting diﬀerence in ﬁnancial
development between EU and non-EU members. At the sample mean of energy
intensity, an improvement of the LFD from the 25th percentile to the 75th
percentile of the distribution is associated with a 14% potential reduction of
ﬁrms' energy intensity. The second, the eﬀect of local ﬁnancial conditions is
stronger for small and medium size ﬁrms. Our results show that the eﬀect of
our LFD indicator is strictly negative for ﬁrms with less than 630 employees.
Additionally, we decompose the eﬀect of ﬁnancial access on energy intensity
conditional to ﬁrm size. Our results investigate the connection between the
ﬁrm size conditional eﬀect of ﬁnance on energy intensity and the scope of the
ﬁnancial market. Larger ﬁrms are able to improve their energy consumption
through broader (nationwide) ﬁnancial conditions. Whereas smaller enterprises
are more constrained by local ﬁnancial access, and beneﬁt relatively less from
country ﬁnancial in-depth.
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Our empirical ﬁndings suggest that the local ﬁnancial development eﬀect on
energy intensity is larger than the eﬀect of countrywide ﬁnancial conditions only
for smaller ﬁrms, up to twenty employees. Whereas, both variables (LFD and
country ﬁnancial development) are partially correlated and should both catch
an overall ﬁnancial access eﬀect, this ﬁnding is important from an economic
policy point of view. An eﬀective and appropriate policy aiming to decrease
ﬁrms' energy consumption through a better access to ﬁnancial funds, should
focus local implementation and targeting small businesses.
In a broader perspective, our results imply further policy recommendations.
Thus, improving information on medium term proﬁtability of energy-saving
investments should also increase incentives to invest in energy eﬃciency. Deep-
ening the competition among banking sector and avoid market segmentation,
should improve ﬁnancial access at the local level. Finally, it is important to re-
inforce and/or implement bankruptcy law and appropriate legal framework for
ﬁnancial sector (Rona-Tas and Guseva, 2013) in ECA region. By ensure loans
pay-back, this should improve the overall conditions of ﬁnancial availability, in
particular for small sized borrowers.
A Appendix
Table A1: List of countries
Transition:
Albaniaa, Azerbaijana, Belarusa, Bulgariaa, Croatiaa, Czech Republica,b, Estoniaa,b,
Georgiaa, Hungarya,b, Kazakhstana, Kyrgyz Republic, Latviaa,b, Lithuaniaa,b,
Macedonia FYRa, Moldovaa, Polanda,b, Romaniaa, Russian Federationa, Serbiaa,
Slovak Republica,b, Sloveniaa,b, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukrainea, Uzbekistana
Industrialised:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA
Emerging:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia,
Mexico, Hong Kong, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Africa,
South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela
aSampled countries included in the ﬁnal sample in tables 3 to 8.
bEuropean Union members of the ECA region as in 2004.
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Table A2: Summary statistics - Firm-level sample BEEPS 2008-2009
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum N
Energy intensity 0.09 0.105 0 0.734 1263
Log output 16.785 2.876 8.825 26.427 1263
Log capital 15.442 2.995 7.09 27.048 1263
Log labour 3.917 1.42 0.693 8.532 1263
Firm age 19.366 21.038 1 183 1263
Share of skilled workers 21.538 21.66 0 100 1263
Growth 0.536 1.114 -6.026 7.412 1263
Firm establishment:
Former state owned 0.282 0.45 0 1 1261
State owned 0.016 0.125 0 1 1261
Private de novo 0.636 0.481 0 1 1261
Private subsidy of
public company 0.016 0.125 0 1 1261
Joint venture with
foreign partner 0.04 0.195 0 1 1261
Other type of
establishment 0.012 0.108 0 1 1261
Locality population:
Capital city 0.263 0.44 0 1 1263
Over 1 million 0.095 0.293 0 1 1263
Over 250,000 to 1 million 0.147 0.355 0 1 1263
Over 50,000 to 250,000 0.209 0.406 0 1 1263
Less than 50,000 0.286 0.452 0 1 1263
Table reports summary statistics of the variables used in our regressions and based on the BEEPS
(2008-2009) data. Energy intensity is expressed as the ratio of energy cost over total variable cost.
Output is measured by the total sales, capital by the net book value of the capital and labour by
the number of full-time employees. Firm age, share of skilled workers and growth represent our
ﬁrm controls: age of the ﬁrm, share of employees with degree and the sales performance of the ﬁrm
over the last three years (log of the ratio of total sales during the last ﬁscal year to sales three years
ago). Former state owned, state-owned, private de novo, private subsidy of public company, joint-
venture with foreign partner and other type of establishment are dummies capturing the way the
ﬁrm was established. Locality population are a set of ﬁve dummies capturing the size of locality.
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